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Outlook and Appraisal 
 
 
Overview 
 
 
There was evidence of some genuine growth in the Scottish economy in the 
third quarter of last year. Also the new GDP methodology and revisions have 
meant the fit with the UK economy during recession and recovery is closer. 
The recovery has been a little stronger than the earlier data suggested but still 
a little weaker than the UK as a whole. But survey evidence suggests a 
weakening in the final quarter of 2012 and uncertain prospects for 2013. It is 
quite  clear  the  main  components  of  aggregate  demand  in  the  Scottish 
economy remain weak. Moreover, there is little or no evidence of rebalancing 
away from household consumption toward investment and net exports. From 
the latest Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data it is evident the 
contribution of components of demand to growth between the second and 
third quarters came almost exclusively from Scottish household consumption 
and to a small extent from government spending. Net trade and investment 
made a negative contribution. 
 
Despite the strong contribution of private consumption there is little doubt that 
household spending in Scotland remains weak and will continue to be weak. 
The fourth quarter retail sales index reported falling sales volumes and flat 
nominal expenditures, with spending weaker than in the UK. Earnings growth 
remains low at around 2% per annum which is less than the rate of inflation 
and so indicates falling real earnings, now back to 1999 levels. The labour 
market in Scotland shows falling measured unemployment but from the middle 
of last year employment is falling and the number inactive continues to rise. 
The 'real' level of unemployment is clearly higher and that will contribute to 
weak household spending on goods and services. The housing market is flat 
with no growth in house prices and therefore offering no boost to household 
wealth and increased spending. Equity prices are rising as risk assets have 
come back into favour. But it is unlikely that this will have much impact on 
consumer spending because of the low levels of share ownership and the 
likely transience of the equity 'boom'. The Scottish household saving rate is 
high and rising and at 11.1% is 3.4 percentage points higher than in the UK. 
For all these reasons household spending is likely to continue to be weak. 
 
Government fiscal consolidation is set to increase as the UK Government 
strives to meets its target of  balance  in  its structural (cyclically adjusted) 
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current budget in five years. Most of the future adjustments concern spending 
rather than taxation with 68% of planned benefit cuts and 78% of current 
departmental spending cuts still to come after April this year. These cuts will 
depress  household  demand  as  well  as  reducing  government  spending 
directly. 
 
Investment and net trade contributed negatively to growth in the third quarter 
of last year and there is little sign of an upturn in the near future, although 
prospects should pick up during 2014. But it all depends on the state of 
household demand in Britain and abroad and there is no guarantee given all 
the negative influences that the expected pick up will emerge. As the latest 
SNAP data reveal, since the second quarter of 2011 investment spending in 
Scotland has fallen relative to its level in 2008. And the prospects for a growth 
in the contribution of net trade depend much on the recovery of demand and 
output in the eurozone from the current recession and wider growth of world 
trade. Huge uncertainties exist over eurozone prospects. The main beacon of 
hope is recovery in the US economy but this is not without its uncertainties. 
 
Finally, while we might see some further and perhaps innovative monetary 
policy loosening when the new Governor Mark Carney takes up his post in 
July, we shouldn't expect much from monetary policy in directly boosting 
growth. While the economy continues at zero nominal interest rates there is 
little that traditional monetary policy can do to boost growth. But it can lower 
real rates by allowing, or acquiescing in, a higher inflation rate, and charging 
for holding bank deposits (negative interest rates). It can also participate in 
pumping money directly in the economy by financing the government deficits 
by printing new money (helicopter money). This is essentially fiscal policy 
rather than monetary policy but we shall see if there are any innovations 
forthcoming  from  the  new  Governor  that  might  help  the  British  economy 
escape its liquidity trap, while bearing the burden of fiscal consolidation. 
 
The more rational policy approach, however, would be for the Chancellor in 
his Budget in March to slow the pace of fiscal consolidation, and undertake a 
massive infrastructure investment programme while borrowing costs remain 
so low. Ironically, the UK lost its AAA credit rating not because of fiscal 
profligacy but because of austerity. The austerity has severely lowered growth 
prospects, hence low tax revenue prospects and continuing lack of progress in 
dealing with the deficit. This is exactly what many world class Keynesian 
economists had predicted. The only silver lining in the credit rating downgrade 
is that it will from previous evidence e.g. Japan, and the US, have no effect on 
the UK long-term borrowing rate. The financial markets do not rate highly the 
credit agencies ability to judge sovereign debt default prospects. And they are 
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right. The way is still open for a massive boost to infrastructure spending in 
the UK. If only the government would take it. 
 
Against this background we have reduced our forecasts for GDP growth in 
2013 and 2014 to 0.9% and 1.7%, respectively. We now forecast 2015 for the 
first time and expect growth to be higher in that year, at 1.9%, as recovery 
finally, and hopefully, takes hold. Job creation remains high in 2012 as many 
part-time, self-employed jobs, were created offering low hours as full-time jobs 
were lost as output growth remained weak. We predict net job creation of 
9,400 this year, rising to 19,150 in 2014 and 31,800 in 2015. The bulk of the 
net job creation is in the production sector, with the service sector contributing 
much more to job creation in 2014 and 2015. Our projection for unemployment 
on the ILO measure at the end of 2012 is now 204,050. We continue to expect 
the unemployment position to deteriorate slightly in 2013 and 2014 compared 
to 2012 due to weaker output and employment growth. Unemployment is now 
forecast to be 218,300 by the end of 2013 and 228,500 in 2014. By the end of 
2015 we project that unemployment will have fallen back to 204,100 as the 
economy recovers more strongly. But we would warn that many workers are 
leaving the labour market probably because of an inability to find work. Hence, 
the measured unemployment rate is becoming a less and less accurate 
measure of the extent of labour reserves and the underlying misery of job loss. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
 
 
Figure 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 2007q1 - 2012q3 
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The latest Scottish GDP data for the third quarter of last year show that the Scottish economy grew by 
0.6% in the third quarter, compared to growth of 0.9% in the UK see Figure 1. This is a commendable 
Scottish performance. It is commendable because the so-called 'Olympic bounce' was expected, and is 
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likely to have been, much weaker here than in the UK. So, it is probable that the 0.6% figure represents 
'genuine' growth in Scotland whereas the 0.9% UK figure contains a large transient element. 
 
But what is perhaps more interesting than the third quarter results is the effect of methodology and data 
source revision on the nature and profile of Scotland's recovery from recession. 
 
The Release states that 
 
"This publication incorporates a number of updates to methodology and source data. This is the 
first Scottish GDP publication fully based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007, 
which is a major revision to the previous SIC 2003. As part of this process, annual GVA weights 
since 1998 for each industry have been updated following their estimation in a SIC 2007 based 
Supply-Use framework. The most recent annual GVA weights now relate to 2009, updated from 
2007 in the previous publication. This update means that the latest estimates better reflect the 
current structure of the Scottish economy." 
 
It also means that there is a more accurate like-for-like comparison with the UK. The effect on Scotland's 
recovery from recession is marked as Figure 2 shows. 
 
 
 
The three quarters of negative growth to the second quarter evident in the previous release have now 
reduced to two. The scale of the Great Recession is slightly reduced to a drop of -5.6% rather than 
-5.8%. And now Scotland stands with the UK in being just under 3% below the pre-recession peak, 
whereas in the previous quarter Scotland was more adrift from the UK. 
 
The Scottish recovery is still slightly weaker than the UK but not by much. Later expected revisions to 
the UK GDP data may change the relative picture again. 
 
But as we noted in earlier Commentaries the aggregate output figures flatter the Scottish recovery 
because of the statistical quirk that the UK figures include all of oil production whereas the Scottish data 
do not. With oil production weak this has affected the Scottish-UK GDP relative as CPPR previously 
pointed out. As the data excluding oil and gas production show, presented in Figure 3, the Scottish 
recovery from the Great Recession is still clearly weaker than the UK. 
PAGE 7 VOLUME 36 NUMBER 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning now to individual sectors of the economy, we see that the Scottish service sector, which 
accounts for 72% of GDP in Scotland and 77% in the UK, was weaker in Scotland in the third quarter. 
Scottish service GVA grew by 0.3% here compared to growth of 1.2% in the UK as Figure 4 shows. 
 
 
Figure 4: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth 2007q1 to 2012q3 
 
2.0 
 
1.5 
 
1.0 
 
0.5 
 
0.0 
 
-0.5 
 
-1.0 
 
-1.5 
 
-2.0 
 
Scotland  UK 
 
-2.5 
 
-3.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But over the year - that is four quarters over previous four quarters - the service sector in Scotland grew 
by 1.5%, which was slightly better than UK service sector growth of 1.2%. It is worth noting that the 
latest data release has changed its yearly growth measures from the four quarter on four quarter usual 
method to growth between the corresponding quarters of the respective years. This seems to us a less 
satisfactory measure of annual growth than the four quarter approach. (See below in Forecasts of the 
Scottish Economy section, Box 1). 
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The state of the recovery in Scottish and UK services is presented in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic 
prices 2007q1 to 2012q3 
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By the third quarter of this year, Scottish services GVA was still -2.7% below its pre-recession peak 
compared to a UK position where the sector has finally recovered its pre-recession peak output to stand 
0.3% above that level. The loss of Scottish service sector output in the recession was -4.5%, a little 
more than the -4.1% output loss in services in the UK. So, it is clear that despite the slightly stronger 
growth performance of Scottish services over the year to the 3rd quarter, the sector is very weak 
compared to its UK counterpart. Some recovery is evident but unlike UK services there is still a long way 
to go before pre-recession peak output is regained. 
 
The weakness of the production sector here noted in the previous Commentary now seems to have 
ceased. Output rose by 1.9% in the quarter compared to a rise of 0.7 per cent in the UK. Over the year - 
PAGE 9 VOLUME 36 NUMBER 3  
 
 
 
 
four quarter on four quarter - production GVA rose by 0.2% in Scotland compared to a large fall of -2.5% 
in the UK. A key reason for this was the markedly improved performance of Scottish manufacturing as 
Figure 6 shows. 
 
Manufacturing grew by 3% in the quarter but fell by -0.3% over the year. This can be compared with the 
performance of UK manufacturing which grew by only 0.7% in the quarter and contracted by -1.4% over 
the year. 
 
Figure 7 shows the impact of the latest data on the manufacturing sector's recovery from recession. 
 
 
 
 
Scottish manufacturing GVA now stands at -4% below the pre-recession peak, while the figure for UK 
manufacturing is -8.5%. The effect of the new weights, revised methodology and revised data has been 
to significantly change the nature of the recession and recovery in Scottish manufacturing. The depth of 
recession at -12% is now much the same as in the UK at -12.9%. Previously, the Scottish manufacturing 
recession had been large but shallower at -10.6%. And the recovery is now stronger than previously 
estimated with the position at the latest data point contrasting with the earlier data when at the end of the 
second quarter Scottish manufacturing was some -7.2% below its pre-recession peak. Clearly, the 
strong third quarter performance also helped to lower that. 
 
Within manufacturing, the main boost to growth in the third quarter clearly came from the food and drinks 
sector. GVA rose by 10.2% in the quarter but fell by -1.7% over the year - four quarter on four quarter. 
Computer, electrical an optical products grew by 3.4% in the quarter while other manufacturing grew by 
3.9%. However, the other key sectors in manufacturing all contracted during the quarter: textiles and 
clothing  (-7.6%),  refined  petroleum,  chemicals,  pharmaceuticals  (-2.3%),  and  transport  equipment 
(-2.8%). So, the pick-up in manufacturing is by no means general and very much influenced, we would 
guess, by buoyant whisky sales. 
 
Turning now to construction, the latest data are presented in Figure 8.   Scottish construction GVA fell by 
-0.4% in the quarter and by -10.1% over the year. But UK construction contracted even more in the 
quarter, by -2.5%, but by less, -6.1%, over the year. The sector still continues to be languishing despite 
the pick-up in the second quarter which appears to have evaporated by the 3rd quarter. Figure 9 shows 
the state of the recovery in the construction sector in Scotland and UK. 
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Figure 8:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 2007q1 - 
2012q3 
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The weakened state of the construction industry in both Scotland and the UK is very likely to be due to 
the UK government's fiscal consolidation programme. We noted in the previous Commentary that the 
contraction from the third quarter of 2010 in Scotland may well be related to fiscal consolidation where, 
so far, the bulk of the cuts have fallen on capital expenditure and buildings especially. In the UK where 
there have been similar cutbacks in government capital expenditure, the impact on overall construction 
output might have been somewhat muted by the expenditure on construction projects associated with 
the Olympics. But even here the decline in construction output after the second quarter last year has led 
to both UK and Scottish construction output being not much higher than it was at the trough of the 
recession. 
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Within  services,  the  most  important  private  sector  by contribution  to  GDP,  business  and  financial 
services - 25% of overall GDP and 35% of service sector GVA - grew by 0.9% in both Scotland and the 
UK during the third quarter. But over the year, four quarter on four quarter, the sector grew by 3.9% in 
Scotland compared to slightly weaker growth of 1.6% in the UK. Figure 10 shows the path of GVA in the 
sector during the recession and recovery relative to its pre-recession peak. 
 
The revised data still show that this sector experienced a stronger recession in Scotland than the UK. 
But the downturn is now seen as shallower but more protracted with the trough at -8.3% not being 
reached until the second quarter of 2011. This has to be compared with a trough of -9.5% in the third 
quarter of 2009. It is now clear that after the contraction to 2011Q2 the recovery has been much 
stronger in the Scottish arm of the sector. By the latest quarter the sector in the UK was -1.2% below its 
pre-recession peak and its Scottish counterpart was -2.5% below. 
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Elsewhere in private services, the main sector is distribution, hotels and catering, accounting for 19% of 
services sector output in Scotland, grew by 1.1% in the third quarter compared to 1.9% in the UK. But 
over the year, the sector grew by 0.8% in Scotland compared to 0.5% in the UK. Figure 11 shows the 
performance of the sector during recession and recovery. 
 
What is clear from Figure 11 is that this sector has broadly performed better in Scotland throughout both 
recession and recovery.  While we don't have more disaggregated data to compare Scotland and the 
UK, it looks as if retailing and spending in the high street may have held up better in Scotland than in the 
UK. But we can't be certain about that. 
 
Government & Other Services GVA contracted by -0.1% in Scotland compared to growth of 1.6% in the 
UK. Over the year measured value added in the sector was flat in Scotland compared to a rise of 1.9% 
in the UK. Figure 12 shows performance in recession and recovery. 
 
 
 
We find the strong growth in the sector in the UK difficult to understand. The Scottish sector's 
performance is more intuitively reasonable. In the previous Commentary we noted that "in view of the 
fact that Government accounts for about 88% of the output, how has such an increase come about at a 
time of fiscal consolidation? Is it a genuine increase in the real value of UK government output over the 
period? Is it due to measurement differences between the UK and Scottish government production? Or, 
is it due to measurement error? Either way it is important to resolve this issue because the comparative 
size of the government sector means that the difference in performance is a not insignificant factor in the 
aggregate GVA differential between Scotland and the UK." We are no further forward in resolving these 
questions. 
 
The Labour Market 
 
The latest labour market data (see Overview of the labour market below) show jobs in Scotland falling by 
11,000, and unemployment fell by 13,000 in the latest quarter to December. Over the year, jobs were up 
by just 2,000 while unemployment was lower by 25,000. In the UK employment rose, resulting in the 16- 
64 employment rate rising over the year to 71.5 per cent above Scotland's 70.7 per cent which fell 
slightly over the year. 
 
Figure 13 charts the performance of GDP and employment in Scotland and UK from the pre-recession 
peak to the latest data point in the third quarter of last year - the latest data point for the GVA data. By 
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the latest quarter Scottish GDP was just under -3% below its pre-recession peak, now, after the data 
revisions and methodology change, a shortfall that is identical to the UK. The same, however, cannot be 
said when it comes to the labour market. 
 
Scottish employment stands at around -3.1 per cent below its pre-recession peak. In the UK, in contrast, 
employment is now 0.1% above the previous peak. 
 
 
 
As noted in the previous Commentary, these figures suggest that productivity per worker has fallen 
significantly in the UK since the recession began. But what is now different from the last time when we 
reported is that productivity per worker in Scotland is now much the same as before the recession. 
 
The 'productivity puzzle' appears essentially to be a UK, not a Scottish, problem. Yet, that is not wholly 
correct because while worker productivity does not appear to have fallen markedly in Scotland as it has 
done in the UK, there has been no upturn in productivity. An upturn in productivity is normally associated 
with recovery from recession as labour hoarded in the recession i.e. working fewer hours and/or less 
intensively, works more hours and or more intensively in the recovery. So there is still a puzzle about 
productivity here in Scotland but less marked than in the UK. Some discussion of this is provided in the 
Overview of the labour market below. 
 
Meanwhile, we see falling employment and falling unemployment in Scotland. And that is  quite a 
different picture from the UK. We noted in the last Commentary that if jobs are falling unemployment will 
rise unless workers leave the labour force. Workers might leave the jobs market for demographic 
reasons such as retirement, having a baby, moving into full-time education etc. Such influences are 
usually fairly stable or may exhibit a rising or falling trend. But workers might also leave the labour 
market because they can't find work. Frustrated job seekers may simply stop looking for work and 
declare themselves to not be seeking working to the Labour Force Survey, the source of our 
unemployment data. Economists call this a 'discouraged worker' effect. It is evidenced in the data by 
rising numbers of self-declared inactive workers. 
 
It certainly appears that this is what has been happening in Scotland since the recession began. In the 
latest quarter to December inactive numbers rose by 9,000 and by 27,000 over the year, a rise in the 
inactivity rate of 0.3% points and 0.8% points, respectively. In the UK, in contrast, the inactivity rate fell 
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-0.2% points in the quarter and by -0.8% points over the year. It looks as if the measured Scottish 
unemployment rate is not providing an accurate picture of the state of the Scottish labour market. 
 
We, therefore, hypothesise that the rising inactive numbers in Scotland is a consequence of 
disproportionate  weakness  in  the  Scottish  jobs  market.    Workers  are  discouraged  by  the  lack  of 
available jobs to cease looking for work and leave the labour market. If we also assume that the labour 
market was in equilibrium at the start of the recession then we can compute a 'real' level and rate of 
unemployment by adding back in this 'discouraged worker' effect. This is done in Figure 14 below. 
 
 
 
 
PAGE 15 VOLUME 36 NUMBER 3  
 
 
 
 
The hypothesised 'real' level of unemployment is some 80,000 higher than the official rate and on a 
rising trend. In addition, we have noted that employment is -3.1% below its pre-recession peak. 
 
However, that is not the end of the story. The working population is rising in Scotland so if you express 
employment over the total number of workers economically active and inactive we get Figure 15. 
 
The situation is now worse than at the worst of the recession with employment - working population ratio 
now -5.7% below its pre-recession peak compared to -5.6% in the trough of the recession. There are 
clearly real and continuing problems in the Scottish jobs market. 
 
Forecasts 
 
The second estimate for UK GDP growth in the fourth quarter reported a fall of -0.3% in UK GDP 
unrevised from the previously published estimate. This followed the 1% rise in the third quarter, which 
was much influenced by the Olympics and lower output in the second quarter due to the Queen's 
Jubilee. According to ONS the fall was due to "maintenance at the UK’s largest North Sea oil field, a ‘fall- 
back’ effect from the Olympic and Paralympic Games and underlying weak domestic demand." 
 
Manufacturing production was particularly weak with GVA falling by -1.3%. But service sector output also 
contracted by -0.1%. Construction reported a welcome increase with growth of 0.9% but output in the 
sector fell by -8.2% over the year. Manufacturing GVA contracted by -1.8% over the year, while service 
sector output rose by 1%. Total growth in the UK in 2012 was 0.2%. 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding special factors, it is quite clear the main components of aggregate demand remain 
weak. Moreover, there is little or no evidence of rebalancing away from household consumption toward 
investment and net exports. In the fourth quarter, the main contributors to growth were government 
consumption  and  household  consumption.  Investment  (-0.4%)  and  exports  (-0.5%)  made  a  large 
negative contribution. The decline in exports was offset to some extent by a fall in the demand for 
imports so the contribution of net exports to growth while negative was, at -0.1%, fairly small. Taking the 
year to the fourth quarter the main drivers of growth were again domestic household consumption 
(0.9%) and government final consumption (0.7%). There was almost no contribution from investment 
(0.1%) and a negative contribution from net trade (-0.9%). So, there is no indication here that the British 
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economy is re-balancing as the UK government desires away from household spending on domestic 
goods to net exports and investment. 
 
In Scotland, the new GDP methodology and revisions heave meant the fit with the UK economy has 
been closer. The recovery has been a little stronger than the earlier data suggested but still a little 
weaker than the UK as a whole. The same cannot be said however for employment and labour demand. 
GDP rose by 0.6% in the third quarter. But from the latest Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) 
data published 28 February it is evident the contribution of components of demand to growth between 
the second and third quarters came almost exclusively from Scottish household consumption and to 
small extent from government spending. Net trade and investment made a negative contribution. So, the 
situation is largely identical to the UK. The specific expenditure components are presented in Figure 16 - 
note the chart shows the quarterly growth of the component not its contribution to GDP growth. 
 
Despite the strong contribution of private consumption there is little doubt that household spending in 
Scotland remains and will continue to be weak. The fourth quarter retail sales reported falling sales 
volumes and flat nominal expenditures, with spending weaker than in the UK. Earnings growth remains 
low at around 2% per annum which is less than the rate of inflation and so indicates falling real earnings, 
which the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section of this Commentary below notes are now back to 
1999 levels. The housing market is flat with no growth in house prices and therefore offering no boost to 
household wealth and increased spending. Equity prices are rising as risk assets have come back into 
favour. But it is unlikely that this will have much impact on consumer spending because of the low levels 
of share ownership and the likely transience of the equity 'boom'. The Scottish household saving rate is 
high and rising and at 11.1% is 3.4 percentage points higher than in the UK. For all these reasons 
household spending is likely to continue to be weak. 
 
Government fiscal consolidation is set to increase as the UK Government strives to meets its target of 
balance in its structural (cyclically adjusted) current budget in five years. Most of the future adjustments 
concern  spending  rather  than  taxation  with  68%  of  planned  benefit  cuts  and  78%  of  current 
departmental spending cuts still to come after April this year. These cuts will depress household demand 
as well as reducing government spending directly. 
 
Investment and net trade contributed negatively to growth in the third quarter of last year and there is 
little sign of an upturn in the near future, although prospects should pick up during 2014. But it all 
depends on the state of household demand in Britain and abroad and there is no guarantee given all the 
negative influences that the expected pick up will emerge. As the latest SNAP data reveal since the 
second quarter of 2011 investment spending in Scotland has fallen relative to its level in 2008. And the 
prospects for a growth in the contribution of net trade depend much on the recovery of demand and 
output in the Eurozone from the current recession and wider growth of world trade. Huge uncertainties 
exist over Eurozone prospects. The main beacon of hope is recovery in the US economy but this is not 
without its uncertainties. 
 
Finally, while we might see some further and perhaps innovative monetary policy loosening when the 
new Governor Mark Carney takes up his post in July, we shouldn't expect much from monetary policy in 
directly boosting growth. While the economy continues at zero nominal interest rates there is little that 
traditional monetary policy can do to boost growth. But it can lower real rates by allowing, or acquiescing 
in, a higher inflation rate, and charging for holding bank deposits (negative interest rates). It can also 
participate in pumping money directly in the economy by financing the government deficits by printing 
new money (helicopter money). This is essentially fiscal policy rather than monetary policy but we shall 
see if there are any innovations forthcoming from the new Governor that might help the British economy 
escape its liquidity trap, while bearing the burden of fiscal consolidation. 
 
The more rational policy approach, however, would be for the UK government to slow the pace of fiscal 
consolidation, and undertake a massive infrastructure investment programme while borrowing costs 
remain so low. Ironically, the UK lost its AAA credit rating not because of fiscal profligacy but because of 
austerity. The austerity has severely lowered growth prospects, hence low tax revenue prospects and 
continuing lack of progress in dealing with the deficit. This is exactly what many world class Keynesian 
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economists such as Paul Krugman, Brad deLong, Larry Summers, Simon Wren Lewis and many others 
had predicted. The only silver lining in the credit rating downgrade is that it will from previous evidence 
e.g. Japan, and the US, have no effect on the UK long-term borrowing rate. The financial markets do not 
rate highly the credit agencies ability to judge sovereign debt default prospects. And they are right. The 
way is still open for a massive boost to infrastructure spending in the UK. If only the government would 
take it. 
 
It is against this background that we have prepared our latest forecasts. 
 
GVA Forecasts 
 
For our latest GVA forecasts we continue the presentational procedure adopted in the previous 
Commentary. We present only a central forecast but use estimated forecast errors to establish the likely 
range that the true first estimate of the growth of Scottish GVA will lie between. 
 
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at basic prices - for 2012 to 2015. The forecasts 
are presented in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section of this Commentary 
below. 
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth, 2012-2015 
 
GVA Growth (% per 
annum) 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Central forecast 
 
-0.1 
 
0.9 
 
1.7 
 
1.9 
 
November forecast 
 
 
 
UK  median  independent 
new (February) 
 
Mean  Absolute  Error  % 
points 
 
-0.1 
 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
+/- 0.159 
 
1.3 
 
 
 
1.0 
 
2.2 
 
 
 
1.6 
 
 
 
+/- 1.204 
 
n.a. 
 
 
 
2.1 
 
 
 
+/- 1.204 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows that we have revised down our GDP forecast from the November forecast for the two 
years 2013 and 2014. For 2012, the forecast remains the same at -0.1%, a little weaker than the UK. 
The lower forecasts reflect the continued weakness of domestic demand, in particular government 
spending and consumer expenditure, and weaker than anticipated growth in the rest of the UK and 
Eurozone markets to which Scottish exports are so reliant. The forecast for growth in 2013 has been 
revised down by 0.4%, while 2014’s growth forecast is 0.5% lower. Any further delay from the political 
process leading to potentially critical disruption to activity in the euro area is likely to produce downside 
risks to growth throughout the forecast horizon. 
 
Table 1, also compares our GVA forecasts with the median of latest independent  forecasts for the UK in, 
2012 and 2014 and the average of the new independent medium-term forecasts for 2015 that are 
published by the UK Treasury. These show that we expect Scottish growth to continue to be a little 
weaker than UK growth this year, a little stronger next year and a little weaker in 2015. So, we are now 
forecasting growth of -0.1% in 2012, 0.9% in 2013, 1.7% in 2014 and 1.9% in 2015. Given our previous 
forecast errors the lower and upper bounds for growth in 2012 are expected to be -0.26% and 0.06%, for 
2013, 0.36% and 1.44%, for 2014, 0.50% to 2.90%, and for 2015, 0.70% to 3.10%. 
 
After the predicted fall in output in all major sectors in 2012, production and manufacturing continue to 
be the main sectoral drivers of growth in 2013, 2014 and 2015. Production is forecast to contract by 
-0.1% in 2012 the same as in both services and construction. In 2013, production is projected to grow at 
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2% but this is a reduced forecast from the 3.3% projected in November. Services and construction 
display positive growth this year at 0.7% and 0.6% respectively, less than half the rate in production. 
This relative performance continues in both 2014 and 2015 as forecast growth across all sectors 
increases. Production grows by 3.3% and 3.8% in 2014 and 2015, while service growth is projected to 
be 1.2% and 1.3%. The construction sector continues to lag but picks up to 1.1% and 1.3%. 
 
Employment Forecasts 
 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the 4 years 2012 to 2015 in terms of a central 
and upper and lower forecast. 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2012-2015 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Upper 
 
 
36,850 21,400 44,950 59,100 
 
June forecast                              -19,350                    27,100                     53,350                     n.a. 
 
Central                                        32,650                      9,400                      19,150                   31,800 
 
June forecast                              -25,750                    16,950                     29,450                     n.a. 
 
Lower                                          29,950                     -3,100                      -5,750                    5,150 
 
June forecast                              -32,050                     5,500                       5,850                      n.a. 
 
 
 
The most obvious point about these forecasts is the revisions for 2012. As in the UK we have seen a 
disjoint between what is happening to job creation and what is happening to output. Net jobs have been 
created even as output was flat or falling. Labour productivity has fallen and many of the new jobs are 
part-time with low hours. But since we forecast jobs and not full time equivalents then we must 
accommodate these changes. Hence, on the central forecast, we are now forecasting that net jobs rose 
by 32,650 in 2012, rather than a fall of -25,750. However, job creation weakened in the Scottish labour 
market from the middle of last year so we do not expect such strong jobs growth in 2013 and 2014 even 
though GDP is forecast to rise more quickly. We predict net job creation of 9,400 this year, rising to 
19,150 in 2014 and 31,800 in 2015. The bulk of the 9,400 net job creation this year will be in the 
production sector, where we expect some 7,800 extra net jobs to be created. The service sector sheds 
some -850 jobs but construction adds just under 2,000 jobs and 450 jobs are created in agriculture. In 
2014 and 2015, the service sector begins to create many more jobs, 4,250 and 13,600 respectively. Yet, 
this is still less than the production sector, largely driven by manufacturing jobs growth, where 10,850 
and 14,050 jobs are forecast in the two years. Construction is projected to add around 3,000 jobs in 
each of those years. 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 3. 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies those workers who are out of a job and are 
looking for work, whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed who are in receipt of 
unemployment benefit. We have again revised down our forecasts for unemployment at the end of 2012, 
despite the deteriorating labour market conditions. As the analysis above in the section on the Labour 
Market implies, the variation in the link between output and labour demand and the unanticipated 
changes in labour supply makes unemployment a difficult number to predict. We also see many workers 
leaving the labour market so that the measured unemployment rate becomes a less and less accurate 
measure of the extent of labour reserves and the underlying misery of job loss. Our projection for 
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unemployment on the ILO measure at the end of 2012 is now 204,050. We continue to expect the 
unemployment position to deteriorate slightly in 2013 and 2014 compared to 2012 due to weaker output and 
employment growth. Unemployment is now forecast to be 218,300 by the end of 2013 and 228,500 in 2014. 
By the end of 2015 we project that unemployment will have fallen back to 204,100 as the economy recovers 
more strongly. 
 
 
Table 3: ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment in central 
forecast 2012-2015 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
ILO unemployment  
 
Rate (ILO un/TEA 16+) 
 
7.8% 
 
8.3% 
 
8.6% 
 
7.7% 
 
Numbers 
 
204,050 
 
218,300 
 
228,500 
 
204,100 
 
Claimant count 
 
Rate (CC/CC+total job) 
 
 
 
5.0% 
 
 
 
5.2% 
 
 
 
5.3% 
 
 
 
4.7% 
 
Numbers 
 
137,650 
 
141,900 
 
148,511 
 
130,192 
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